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1. INTRODUCTION
The accelerating forces of technological innovation and
globalization influence the forms enterprises take, generating
a rapid evolution of some organizational types while
threatening others with extinction.' Firms are establishing
innovative links with their suppliers, their distributors and,
increasingly often, their competitors. Grand networks are
being created, indirectly linking, in one way or another,
virtually every firm operating in several important
industries.'
"Professor of Law, Suffolk University (Boston) and Visiting Professor of
Law, Indiana University at Bloomington. A.B. 1976, University of
California at Berkeley; J.D. 1982, Yale University. Portions of this article
were presented, in preliminary form, at the European International
Business Association annual conference held in Lisbon, December 12-14,
1993, and at the law and economics conference sponsored by the
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid, held June 9-10, 1994. David Camino,
Juan Jos6 Durdn, Thomas Koenig, Santos Pastor, Margaret Pearson,
Michael Rustad, Vitor Simoes, Frank Stephen and Joel Trachtman provided
helpful criticism. I am most grateful for the research assistance of Pamela
Antonopoulos, Wayne Carroll, Sharona Eliahou, Andrew Grimes, Laura
Guadagno and Yoon Lee.
'It has been argued that the evolution of business organizations is
Lamarckian, not Darwinian. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp,
Evolutionary Models in Jurisprudence, 64 TEx. L. REV. 645 (1985)
(examining the use of Darwinian models to explain the development of
jurisprudence).
2 The automotive and telecommunications industries are leading examples
of this trend. For empirical studies which describe the links within both of
these industries, see Fr6d6rique Sachwald, The Role of Co-operative
Agreements in the Automobile Industry, Proceedings of the 18th European
International Business Association Annual Conference at the University of
Reading (Dec. 13-15, 1992); P.E. Wells & P.N. Cooke, The Geography of
International Strategic Alliances in the Telecommunications Industry: The
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Complex economic organizations,3 such as strategic
alliances4 and joint ventures, are peculiar institutional
arrangements. They result where (i) access to a productive
input or asset is to be continuous and (ii) limited shared access
to that asset is more efficient than exclusive access. Limited
sharing of access to a productive asset can be effected through
a number of arrangements between firms.
First, shared access can be distributed between the
participating firms by property rights through the institution
of joint ownership. Joint ownership may be exercised either
directly over an asset or over an intermediary corporate
vehicle which owns the asset in question.5
Second, shared access can be distributed by contract,
effectively constituting a partial assignment of property rights,
such as a use. Contract-based distributions of access permit
more subtle relations to be structured among the parties than
would be provided by institutional co-ownership. This
additional precision may be costly, however, which may
explain why co-ownership arrangements are often utilized
Cases of Cable and Wireless, Ericsson, and Fujitsu, 23 ENV'T & PLAN. A 87
(1991); Bernard M. Wolf, The Role of Strategic Alliances in the European
Automotive Industry, in 2 AN ENLARGED EUROPE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY
637 (Harald Vestergaard ed., 1991).
'A complex economic organization involves multiple firms with
conflicting, and often competing, strategic interests. It is more complex
than an ordinary corporate grouping.
A strategic alliance has been defined as
a bilateral or multilateral relationship characterized by the
commitment of two or more partner firms to a common goal. A
strategic alliance typically includes a constellation of agreements
involving (1) technology swaps, (2) joint R&D or co-development,
and/or (3) the sharing of complementary assets, such as where one
party does manufacturing and the other distribution for a co-
developed product.
Thomas M. Jorde & David J. Teece, Innovation, Cooperation, and Antitrust,
in ANTITRUST, INNOVATION, AND COMPETITIVENESS 47, 55 (Thomas M. Jorde
& David J. Teece eds., 1992).
' This scenario corresponds to the equity joint venture. In this model, two
participating firms own shares in the joint venture, which, in turn, holds the
various assets devoted to the venture's business activity.
s The owner of the residuary share may have greater influence over an
asset than a licensee. For example, Toshiba's access to Motorola's
technology was conditioned on Toshiba's promotion of Motorola's products
in Asian markets. See Mark Hornung, Surging Semiconductors Improve
Motorola Picture, CRAIN'S CHI. BUS., May 11, 1987, at 71.
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instead. Complex economic organizations will frequently
employ several types of institutional arrangements, adopting
co-ownership with respect to some assets and more complex
sharing arrangements with respect to others.
The basic legal unit corresponding to the firm, the
corporation, is often conceived as a set of pre-assembled legal
relationships drawn from the elemental legal forms of contract
and property.7 There is, for the moment, a dearth of law
regardingjoint ventures and strategic alliances which specifies
their internal ordering, their relationships to assets within
their control, or their external dealings.' This pristine state
of affairs may benefit business planners seeking flexibility in
structuring relationships.' Strategic alliances and joint
ventures are themselves custom-outfitted with features drawn
from a number of more basic elements, using contract, agency
and corporation law together, as well as property-based
institutions. Our understanding of these organizations, their
uses and future evolution, will be enhanced by a fuller
appreciation of the economics driving more complex assemblies
of the basic institutional units.
Legal and economic thinkers have focused much attention
during the past two decades on an effort to determine why
ordinary firms exist. Competing theories of the firm arise in
both perfect and imperfect' competition varieties. By
' This description of the nexus between contract and property in the
corporation is incomplete. Not only does the corporation have an
institutional relationship with its shareholders, directors, officers and
agents, but it also possesses the capacity of independent, direct ownership
of property.
"An example of these legal gaps is the issue of the insolvency of a
strategic alliance. Some law specific to complex organizations is, however,
developing. See Zenichi Shishido, Conflicts ofInterests and Fiduciary Duties
in the Operation of a Joint Venture, 39 HASTINGS L.J. 63 (1987) (discussing
how courts handle conflicts of interest in joint ventures); Allan W. Vestal,
"Ask Me No Questions and I'll Tell You No Lies": Statutory and Common-
Law Disclosure Requirements Within High-Tech Joint Ventures, 65 TUL. L.
REv. 705 (1991) (examining existing disclosure requirements applicable to
high-tech joint ventures under statutory and common law).
' On the other hand, legal requirements may reduce organizational costs.
The legal institution of the business corporation is thought to be a useful
pre-packaged set of relational norms and, therefore, a means of reducing
costs.
"0 In the imperfect competition category, some theories explain the
existence of firms as a mechanism to aid the expansion of market power
1995]
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contrast, far less is understood about why more complex
structures exist; indeed, the existence of complex structures
does not fit comfortably within any of the contemporary
theories of the firm.
The transaction cost school, founded by Coase" and
advanced by Oliver Williamson, 2 is the dominant perfect
competition explanation for why firms exist, that is, why
certain transactions are internalized. The basic outline of the
transaction cost model, or at least a caricature of it, is well
known: transactions are internalized when they can be
effected most efficiently within firms.' 3 Certain types of
transactions are more likely to be conducted efficiently within
firms than across markets. These "market failure" cases often
feature transaction-specific (unique) assets or informational
asymmetries.' 4 Consequently, the transaction cost theory of
(why market power initially resides in a firm, however, is left unstated) or
to divide factor providers, such as labor, in order to exploit them. Firms
embody the suppression of both vertical and horizontal competition. See
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 17-18 (1988)
(discussing the use of vertical and horizontal integration to achieve an
advantageous position in the market).
" Ronald H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA (n.s.) 386
(1937).
12 See Oliver E. Williamson, Comparative Economic Organization: The
Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives, 36 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 269 (1991);
see also OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES: ANALYSIS AND
ANTITRUST IMPLICATIONS (1975) [hereinafter, WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND
HIERARCHIES] (using the transactional approach to study the organization
of economic activity); OLIVER E. WILLIAMSON, THE ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS
OF CAPITALISM: FIRMS, MARKETS, RELATIONAL CONTRACTING (1985)
[hereinafter, WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS] (examining economic
organization "through the lens of transaction cost economizing").
13 The tautologic character of this principle has been recognized by many.
See, e.g., Peter J. Buckley, New Theories of International Business: Some
Unresolved Issues, in THE GROWTH OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS 34, 42
(Mark Casson ed., 1983) (describing internalization as tautological in
nature). Even Williamson has noted this point and has promoted himself,
among others, as overcoming this shortcoming. See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 4 n.4.
14 Kenneth Arrow argues that market exchanges of information are
appreciably more costly than internal exchanges. See Kenneth J. Arrow,
Economic Welfare and the Allocation of Resources for Invention, in THE
RATE AND DIRECTION OF INVENTIVE ACTIVITY: ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL
FACTORS 609, 614-19 (1962); see also W.H. Davidson & Donald G.
McFetridge, International Technology Transactions and the Theory of the
Firm, 32 J. INDUS. ECON. 253, 253 (1984) (noting Arrow's argument).
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the firm becomes a catalogue of types of market failure. 5
Transaction cost theorists have emphasized the failure of
markets to effectuate the transfer of technology and other
information as a major determinant of the unitary firm'" and
its transnational variant, the multinational enterprise
(MNE).Y These particular varieties of market failure are
associated with inputs displaying "public goods"
characteristics, 8 productive assets that can be utilized at a
15 A transaction cost theory of complex organizations will likewise result
in the identification of a characteristic market failure, but the rejection of
internalization as a solution must also be explained. Williamson notes that
the general term "organizational failure" encompasses both market failure
and its symmetrical counterpart, "internal organizational failure."
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 12, at 20. A complex
organization must overcome both of these challenges.
'6 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 292-94.
17 See PETER J. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE FUTURE OF THE
MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1976) (discussing the origins and prospective
growth of the MNE); see also PETER J. BUCKLEY & MARK CASSON, THE
ECONOMIC THEORY OF THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE (1985) (examining
the theory behind the multinational enterprise); JOHN CANTWELL,
TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION AND MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS (1989)
(examining the relation between research and technological innovation and
trends in the competitiveness of major industrialized countries); RICHARD
E. CAVES, MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (1982)
(discussing international transfers of technology); David J. Teece,
Transactions Cost Economics and the Multinational Enterprise, 7 J. ECON.
BEHAV. & ORGANIZATION 21 (1986) (analyzing the MNE under the
transaction cost theory).
"' The modern theory of public goods is generally traced to Paul A.
Samuelson, The Pure Theory of Public Expenditure, 36 REV. ECON. & STAT.
387 (1954). There are varying definitions of public goods in the literature:
Goods and services which are not marketable to individual
purchasers because the benefits flow to all in a group regardless of
whether they all pay. Examples are national defense, river-channel
dredging, and cloud seeding.
Public goods also may be goods which, though marketable, have
substantial spillover benefits or spillover costs to those not
purchasing them-there are lots of innocent bystanders affected.
A LEXICON OF ECONOMICS 248 (Kenyon A. Knopf ed., 1991).
A commodity or service which if supplied to one person is available
to others at no extra cost. It may be contrasted with a PRIVATE
GOOD where one person's consumption precludes the consumption
of the same unit by another person ....
THE MIT DICTIONARY OF MODERN ECONOMICS 352 (David W. Pearce ed.,
1992).
Finally, for an extended discussion of the modern theory of public goods,
1995]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
declining marginal cost and, at the same time, may be
excluded from others' use. These market-failure arguments
rely as much on the intrinsic qualities of the good concerned
as on the nature of the transaction and thus suggest a goods
approach to the theory of the firm. 9
A goods approach, as opposed to a transactions approach,
to a theory of the firm displays some analytic texture that is
easily lost when speaking abstractly about transactions.
Goods, both public and private, may be created or lost, used or
disused, bought or sold, shared or hoarded. Further, it seems
just as meaningful to speak about the internalization of goods,
such as productive assets or factors, through transactions as
it is to speak of internalizing transactions themselves. A
goods-oriented model eases the integration of important, if not
essential, imperfect competition considerations.
The framework proposed here considers two dimensions by
which access to productive goods is obtained." The first
dimension expresses whether access to an input is to be on a
spot or on a longer-term, continuous basis. This line of
analysis is consistent with transaction cost theory. The second
dimension captures whether access to a productive good may
be shared without destroying oligopoly rents. Taken together,
these dimensions suggest the following matrix:
see THE NEW PALSGRAVE: A DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 1061-65 (John
Eatwell et al. eds., 1987).
"' The goods approach should be contrasted with property theories of the
firm. See Armen A. Alchian & Harold Demsetz, Production, Information
Costs, and Economic Organization, 62 AM. ECON. REV. 777 (1972)
(discussing various theories of the firm); Sanford J. Grossman & Oliver D.
Hart, The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and
Lateral Integration, 94 J. POL. ECON. 691 (1986) (focusing on the property
theories).
2 This is not the first attempt to use a two-dimensional framework to
explain complex organizations. Bernard Garrette maps strategic alliances
on one axis running between market and hierarchy and on a second axis
measuring the symmetry or asymmetry of the participating firms' respective
competencies. See Bernard Garrette, Actifs Sp~cifiques et Cooperation: Une
Analyse des Strategies d'Alliance, 50 REVUE D'ECONOMIE INDUSTRIELLE 15,
24-25 (1989).
Ahern presents a two-dimensional analysis of strategic alliance, with
one axis representing the maximization of efficiency and the other the
maximization of control, a concept drawn from the resource dependence
theory. See R. Ahern, The Role of Strategic Alliances in the International
Organization of Industry, 25 ENV'T & PLAN. A 1229, 1234-35 (1993).
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MATRIX OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
SPOT CONTINUOUS
EXCLUSIVE [empty Firm (internalization)MNE
cell?] Output Contracts
Exclusive Distributorship
SEMI- Strategic Alliances
EXCLUSIVE Equity Joint Ventures
NON- Market Licensing
EXCLUSIVE Franchising
This article will examine why complex organizational forms
exist. It will focus particular attention on two archetypes: the
equity joint venture and the strategic alliance. Resort to
complex organizational forms favors the selective sharing of
access to certain strategic productive assets. These assets will
be termed quasi-public goods because they may be shared at
little marginal cost provided the sharing or joint-use is
pointedly restricted to avoid a general diffusion, which would
destroy economic rents. While equity joint ventures facilitate
access to assets through the institution of joint ownership,
strategic alliances rely on more complex, contract-based shared
use of important productive goods. Some complex
organizations exhibit features of both forms. For example, the
Airbus consortium21 resembles a strategic alliance to the
extent that each participating firm independently
manufactures aircraft components at its own facilities while,
at the same time, it resembles an equity joint venture in
carrying out final assembly and marketing through consortium
resources.
" Airbus Industrie is a consortium of European aerospace firms which
jointly produce passenger aircraft. See Roger Eglin, Lessons of the Airbus
Example, MGMT. TODAY, Sept. 1992, at 27 (citing Airbus as a prime example
of European industrial collaboration).
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2. THE MANY COLORS OF TRANSACTIONS
2.1. Transaction Cost Theory and the Organizational
Continuum
Transaction cost theory proposes an organizational
continuum running between the poles of internalization and
market-contracting.22 Strategic alliances, joint ventures and
other organizational hybrids have been described as middle
points on this continuum:2 3
Organizational Continuum
Market Hybrids(?) Firm
Relational Contracts
Asset Specificity-----------
In his earlier work, Williamson argued that hybrids should
be rather rare.24 Later, Williamson revised his thinking,
" Williamson speaks of the "gamut from discrete market exchange at the
one extreme to centralized hierarchical organization at the other, with
myriad mixed or intermediate modes filling the range in between."
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 16.
" See Jean-Frangois Hennart, Explaining the Swollen Middle: Why Most
Transactions Are a Mix of "Market" and "Hierarchy" 15-19 (1992)
(unpublished manuscript, on file with author) (discussing the differences
between prices and hierarchy as methods of organizing); see also Hans B.
Thorelli, Networks: Between Markets and Hierarchies, 7 STRATEGIC MGMT.
J. 37, 37 (1986) (acknowledging that arrangements exist that fall somewhere
between internalization and the open market).
Garrette argues that his empirical study of strategic alliances supports
the notion of an organizational continuum. Garrette, supra note 20, at 27.
In his study, he asserts:
[Ll'idle d'un continuum des formes de relations inter-entreprises
entre le "march6" et la "hi~rarchie" trouve une bonne validation
empirique. Ces deux formes ne sont pas les deux 61lments dune
alternative, il faut plut~t les consid~rer comme les p6les extremes
d'un mgme axe sur lequel les entreprises qui s'allient se
positionnent en fonction du rapport de concurrence/association
qu'elles entretiennent.
Id.
24 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 83 (citing
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acknowledging that the population of complex economic
organizations was far greater than he had earlier thought and
that organizational forms were much more evenly
distributed.25 More recently, Jean-Frangois Hennart has
argued that the two poles, firms and market contracting,
actually describe extreme and quite rare cases and that most
organizations fall somewhere in between."
Williamson's amended organizational view remains that of
a continuum," with the middle cases displaying features of
both markets and firms. 8 To say that certain organizations
are part-firm, part-market may only state what is true about
all production: some transactions are internalized and are
commanded, and others remain outside the firm and are
controlled through the price mechanism.
I and others have argued, however, that these complex
organizational forms are not blended cases29 but instead are
distinct types of institutional arrangements. °  What
WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 12).
" See id. at 83-84. In his critique of Williamson's transaction cost
analysis, Neil Kay argues that markets are "very rare and occasional
device[sl." N.M. Kay, Markets, False Hierarchies and the Evolution of the
Modern Corporation, 17 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORGANIZATION 315, 331 (1992).
26 Hennart describes the distribution as displaying a "swollen middle."
Hennart, supra note 23, at 2 (quoting CHARLES PERROW, COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ESSAY 255 (3d ed. 1986)).
2 Williamson explains:
[T]he hybrid mode is characterized by semi-strong incentives, an
intermediate degree of administrative apparatus, displays semi-
strong adaptations of both kinds, and works out of a semi-legalistic
contract law regime. As compared with markets and hierarchy,
which are polar opposites, the hybrid model is located between the
two of these in all five attribute respects.
Williamson, supra note 12, at 281 (emphasis added).
" Williamson's interest in the middle of the organizational continuum is
chiefly with relational contracts. Id. at 280. For a discussion of the
relational contract literature, see Jeffery Atik, Technology and Distribution
as Organizational Elements Within International Strategic Alliances, 14 U.
PA. J. INT'L Bus. L. 273, 276 n.19 (1993).
" For this reason, the author has resisted using the term "hybrid" to
describe complex organizational forms, such as joint ventures and strategic
alliances.
'* See Atik, supra note 28, at 287 (noting that transaction cost theory
must show why complex organizations are transaction cost minimizing when
compared to unitary firms); see also Bryan Borys & David B. Jemison,
Hybrid Arrangements as Strategic Alliances: Theoretical Issues in
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distinguishes these complex organizational forms is the kind
of transaction effected: a sharing of access or use. If this is
so, according to Williamson's prescription that organizational
forms are determined by a comparison of alternative
institutional arrangements, 3  the organizational form
decision 2 for coordinating production involves considering at
least three alternative forms: (i) market contracting, (ii)
internalization and (iii) shared access to a productive asset
within a complex economic organization. This organizational
decision must be made with respect to each productive asset
or factor. 3
The choice-of-form decision with respect to complex
economic organizations, such as joint ventures and strategic
alliances, can be approached somewhat inductively, by asking
why these institutional forms of shared access were preferred
to market-contracting and internalization 4 with respect to
particular assets. Shared use, it seems, can minimize
transaction costs in certain circumstances33  while
Organizational Combinations, 14 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 234 (1989) (exploring
the unique qualities of hybrids).
" Williamson insists that "[c]omparative economic organization never
examines organization forms separately but always in relation to
alternatives." Williamson, supra note 12, at 269. As a result, he merely
proposes an analytic methodology and not a model of how managers decide
to coordinate production. Id. at 269-70.
' There is a danger in characterizing the determination of an
organizational form as a "decision." Firms may not, in any meaningful
sense, engage in such decision-making because managers may be completely
unaware of how organizational forms are determined.
' Thus, there is not one organizational form decision but many such
decisions.
' Borys and Jemison argue that complex organizations are formed to
avoid the disadvantages of conventional firms:
Unitary organizations often suffer from, among other things,
operational inefficiency, resource scarcity, lack of facilities to take
advantage of economies of scale, or risks that are more
appropriately spread across several business units. Hybrids offer
a wide range of solutions to such problems because they draw upon
the capabilities of multiple, independent organizations.
Borys & Jemison, supra note 30, at 235. They do not, however, explain why
internalization cannot rectify these disadvantages. See id.
' See Bruce Kogut, Joint Ventures: Theoretical and Empirical
Perspectives, 9 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 319, 320 (1988) (asserting that a
necessary condition of joint ventures is that "the production cost achieved
through internal development or acquisition is significantly higher than
[Vol. 16:1
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol16/iss1/1
COMPLEX ENTERPRISES
simultaneously conserving the economic rents these specific
productive assets generate.
Complex economic organizations are frequently established
between firms of different nationalities; they are becoming a
common feature of the international business landscape. The
international economic traditions of location-of-production and
MNE theory36 inform the analysis presented here. The
presence of national frontiers, which impede the flow of
factors, however, is not necessary to explain the existence of
joint ventures and strategic alliances.
The decision to establish a complex institutional
arrangement can be thought of as a set of sub-decisions,
including: (i) where to locate various stages of production;"7
(ii) where to locate the boundaries between the firm and the
exterior with respect to necessary productive assets;38 and
(iii) whether the organizational boundaries should be hard, as
in market-contracting, or soft, as in shared access.39 In
international joint ventures and strategic alliances, for a host
of environmental and institutional reasons, these
organizational boundaries often correspond to national market
frontiers.
Depending on the market, local management may be more
or less efficient than foreign management in employing local
external sourcing for at least one of the partners").
"6 For an excellent summary of the literature regarding MNE theory, see
Francesca Sanna Randaccio, Main Developments in the Theory of the
Multinational Enterprise: A Critical View, 38 RIVISTA INTERNAZIONALE DI
SCIENZE ECONOMIcHE E COMMERCIALI 151 (1991).
' The location-of-production element is relevant to all possible forms of
the institutional arrangement. Where production is internalized across
national frontiers, an enterprise is said to be multinational.
A productive asset within a firm boundary is internalized; a productive
asset outside a boundary is not. A firm requiring access to a productive
asset outside its boundary may either contract in the market for the output
of that asset, or it may arrange for access to the asset and share that access
with others.
" This boundary algorithm differs from that implicitly presented by Borys
and Jemison, who refer to "hybrid-environment" (external) boundaries and
"hybrid-partner" (internal) boundaries. Borys & Jemison, supra note 30, at
238-41.
The notion of a soft boundary may directly relate the two partners
participating in a complex organization. Also, the boundary decision of
whether or not to reject internalization logically takes precedence over
inquiries into the type of boundary.
1995]
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factors systematically; one can think of markets for productive
assets in which both foreign and local managements bid for
ownership. Consequently, the value of certain assets will be
greater in the hands of a foreign firm,4" while others may be
employed optimally by a local firm.4 Resort to a complex
economic organization permits sets of assets to be sorted
between two participating firms, perhaps one local and the
other foreign, thereby providing a mix of access modalities and
improving overall efficiencies.
2.2. Types of Transactions
While transaction cost theory addresses many kinds of
market failures, it tends to have a rather monolithic view of
transactions themselves. It may be that business lawyers and
planners are more sensitive to the many flavors transactions
display than are many theorists.
When transaction cost theorists speak about
internalization, they usually mean ownership, a rather
complete domain over the subject asset of the particular
transaction upon which command governance can be exerted.
Note that internalizing a particular productive asset is, itself,
a transaction that can either be internalized or effected across
a market. A writer who requires photocopies may either
employ a copy shop (market) or acquire a photocopier
(internalization). The transaction by which the photocopier is
acquired may either be effected across a market (purchase
from a photocopier manufacturer) or internalized (self
assembly of thevarious components). Both purchase and do-it-
yourself construction (improbable though it may be) result in
40 For example, it appears that both the Zairian and Zambian copper
reserves were more valuable when owned by multinational copper firms
than when nationalized by the Zairian and Zambian governments because
the multinationals controlled distribution channels and possessed other
technical expertise. See Michael Shafer, Capturing the Mineral
Multinationals: Advantage or Disadvantage?, in MULTINATIONAL
CORPORATIONS: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT
25 (Theodore H. Moran ed., 1985). The newly nationalized firms also
destabilized the pre-existing copper cartel, thereby lowering prices and
producing a copper glut on world markets. Id.
41 Hennart argues that a distribution system is often more productive, and
hence more valuable, when owned by a local firm. See Jean-Frangois
Hennart, A Transaction Costs Theory of Equity Joint Ventures, 9 STRATEGIC
MGMT. J. 361, 371-72 (1988).
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ownership of a photocopier, thereby internalizing the
subsequent transactions of making copies.
Internalization is much more varied than simple
ownership. To the extent that the notion of internalization
conveys a sense of unencumbered operational dominion over a
particular produclive asset, it may take a myriad of legal
forms. Consider the range of transactions that an air carrier
faces in providing service to a particular route. It may
approach an aircraft vendor and buy an airplane for the route.
By "owning" the airplane, the carrier, of course, can direct
where and when it flies.42 Alternatively, it may structure a
financial lease, by which it enjoys the normal operational
incidents of ownership (but perhaps not the owner's tax
benefits) so long as it remains current in its lease payments.
Some default risk is displaced onto the lessor.
If an airline faces a short-term need on a route, it may
alternatively "borrow" or charter an aircraft from another firm,
perhaps even from a rival carrier. Or it may "sell" the route
to another firm and indirectly participate in the financial
benefits arising from operation of the route through the sale
price realized. Finally, an airline may "share codes" with
another carrier43 and divide operational responsibilities. It
is not clear which of these organizational responses represents
internalization and which market-contracting. Indeed, several
of these arrangements appear to represent hybrids of the two
poles.
Internalization and its counterpart legal institution,
ownership, apply not only to discrete assets, such as an
42 An airline's ownership rights are subject to the regulatory power of the
state. Furthermore, its use of an aircraft may be subjected to supervening
private rights. Consider the case of Tabitha the Cat, hiding under the floor
of a Tower Airlines 747 jetliner. Ron Russell, Pet Lost in Jet Eludes
Searchers in a Game of Cat and Mouse, L.A. TIMES, July 2, 1994, at B1.
The cat's owner threatened legal action to take the plane out of service,
pending the cat's removal. Eight Lives to Go, N.Y. TIMES, July 13, 1994, at
A18. The jet flew 12 days and 30,000 miles with Tabitha on board. Id.
Grounding the jet would have cost the airline far more than what a
reasonable person (a non-cat lover) would value Tabitha's life to be worth.
' For a discussion of code sharing, see Seth E. Schofield, As American As
Apple Pie, USAIR MAG., Mar. 1995, at 9. For example, Northwest and KLM
share codes on their joint Boston-Amsterdam service. See OFFICIAL AIRLINE
GUIDE, available in SABRE (an American Airlines database). The same
flight has two codes: NW 38 and KLM 638. Id.
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airplane, but also to larger subassemblies of assets, ranging up
to sizeable business units, which may be viable firms in their
own right. The relationship between the Fisher Body
Company and General Motors provides a useful example."
Fisher had been a stand-alone firm, selling car bodies to
various automobile manufacturers. General Motors
"internalized" Fisher by purchasing its shares and thus
obtaining operational control of its productive capacity."
Implicitly, General Motors and Fisher preferred this
internalization result to other possible institutional
arrangements, such as output contracts between themselves or
with other manufacturers. General Motors, upon acquiring
Fisher, terminated Fisher's ability to deal with other car
manufacturers.46
Of course, only non-human assets can be internalized in
this sense; people (as agents or employees) cannot be fully
internalized.47 The use of command with respect to human
actors is subject to significant legal limitations48 as well as
the functional proclivities of people to shirk which are explored
" See Benjamin Klein et al., Vertical Integration, Appropriable Rents, and
the Competitive Contracting Process, 21 J.L. & ECON. 297, 308-10 (1978)
(discussing the evolution -of the relationship General Motors had with
Fisher, beginning with their contractual agreement in 1919 and ending with
their merger in 1926).
4 Id. at 310.
4 General Motors' acquisition eliminated two markets: the market for
Fisher's shares (its operational control) and the market for Fisher's product
(the car bodies).
4" An employee may always elect to terminate an employment relationship
in the sense that performance cannot be legally compelled. See Lumley v.
Wagner, 42 Eng. Rep. 687 (Ch. 1852) (holding that a court may not order
specific performance of an employment contract but that it may enjoin an
employee from working for a third party); Robert S. Stevens, Involuntary
Servitude by Injunction: The Doctrine of Lumley v. Wagner Considered, 6
CORNELL L.Q. 235 (1921) (discussing the question whether or not a court
should be permitted to order performance of employment contracts and
enjoin employees from working for third parties). See also Bailey v.
Alabama, 219 U.S. 219 (1911) (holding unconstitutional a statute that
effectively compelled personal service in liquidation of a debt); Clyatt v.
United States, 197 U.S. 207 (1905) (noting that peonage is equivalent to
involuntary servitude, which is made unconstitutional by the Thirteenth
Amendment).
4' A firm cannot command an employee to carry out illegal, immoral or
dangerous acts as a matter of public policy.
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in contemporary agency theory.49
An internalized asset or input is subject to more than
command governance; it is also withdrawn from the market
and excluded from other firms. These rival firms are doubly
denied: the owner of the internalized asset may refuse to sell
output to its rivals, and the owner may refuse to sell the asset
itself, thereby prohibiting rivals from effecting a comparable
feat of internalization themselves. Internalization is usually,
though not necessarily, accompanied by a power of exclusion.
Ownership of an asset in a legal sense is often represented
as a bundle of rights. Similarly, the principal in an agency
relationship possesses a series of rights, both with respect to
the agent and with respect to third parties. The owner's rights
include, most importantly, the right of use, and it is from this
right that the possibility of command arises. A principal
enjoys comparable rights in commanding the performance of
the agent.50 But ownership also includes the right to exclude
others. An owner of an asset can secure exclusive use. He or
she may choose not to create a market in the output of the
asset (a refusal to deal) or may refuse to sell the asset itself
(hoarding). Similarly, a principal in an exclusive agency (such
as an employment relationship) can block other firms from
access to an agent's services. Command, of course, is
important, but the power to exclude others is a significant
category of rights incident to ownership that is neglected by
transaction cost theory.
2.3. Transaction Perspectives
In these two examples, the firm with which we are
concerned is fairly clear. The airline or General Motors is the
transactor which faces the relevant institutional choice:
market-contracting, internalization or another alternative with
respect to a desired productive asset. Of course, for every
transaction (or potential transaction) there is a counterpart
", A non-human productive asset may be mechanically unreliable, but it
seems incapable of shirking.
" The law makes finer distinctions between the principal-agent and the
master-servant relationships. In a non-employment relationship, a principal
may not direct the means by which the agent accomplishes the agency. See
RESTATEMENT OF AGENCY § 220 cmt. c (1933).
1995]
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2014
U. Pa. J. Int'l Bus. L.
transactor who faces either the mirror-image51 or different
institutional alternatives. At times, the counterpart transactor
is the asset itself.
52
Transaction cost economic scenarios presume knowledge as
to which "firm" faces the institutional dilemma. They are less
concerned with the transaction as seen by the potential seller
of the aircraft. The seller is believed to be ever-present,
predisposed to sell planes "in the ordinary course of business,"
as lawyers would phrase it. As in the example described
above, the concern lies less with Fisher Body than with
General Motors.53 Given the choice, when considering
internalization, the usual view is that of the acquirer and not
the acquired. The notion of "internalization" bespeaks a
subsuming of one asset within a greater collectivity, yet some
attention should be paid to the transaction from the asset's
"point-of-view." Transaction cost notions are based on a
special perspective; they are drawn from a particular vantage
point.
Some transactions, however, require a deeper assessment
of both transactors' views and fields of decisional
possibility. 4  At the organizational poles, only one
transactor's decision is uncertain and therefore interesting; the
other is given. Where internalization is observed, there is
present a willing seller of the to-be-internalized asset; where
there is market-contracting, there is a willing provider
disposed to sell its products. This, after all, is precisely what
the notion of market-failure seeks to explain, that is, whether
there exists a potential contractor/vendor willing to deal on
acceptable terms.
Complex economic organizations, such as strategic alliances
and joint ventures, commit two firms to an ongoing
relationship constructed around a particular productive asset
6 This is the case of locked-in or mutually dependent contractors.
52 This is the case in a corporate acquisition. Mergers are even more
subtle, as it is often unclear which business unit is doing the internalizing
and which is being internalized.
a See Klein et al., supra note 44, at 308-10.
Harrigan, for example, explains the existence of strategic alliances in
"partner asymmetries," a pre-existing complementarity that optimizes each
contractor's well-being upon entry into the alliance. Kathryn R. Harrigan,
Strategic Alliances and Partner Asymmetries, 28 MGMT. INT'L REV. 53
(1988).
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or good. The continuing, non-trivial interest that each
maintains requires a doubled transaction-possibility analysis.
Both firms are important. To explain the existence of a
complex organization, an accounting must be rendered as to
why this particular mode of organization was the optimal
institutional choice for each participant.
2.4. Transactions Involving Public Goods
Public good notions often underlie transaction cost accounts
of internalized transactions. 5  Transaction cost theory
predicts market failure in cases where a good can be freely
shared at low or declining marginal cost and where the costs
of exclusion are high. Thus, a proprietary technology can be
described as a public good in a market failure story, since the
marginal cost of extending its use is declining and perhaps
approaches zero. Absent effective nondisclosure or the
presence of intellectual property rights, however, the
technology is likely to be free-ridden, thereby depressing the
investment in developing new technologies and depriving the
proprietor firm of expected rents.56 Nondisclosure, a form of
hoarding, is a response to the dissipation of rents caused by
free-riding. It occurs when exclusive use of the technology is
reserved to the firm which develops it. 57 Internalization of
transactions involving a technology or other public good
lessens the probability of other firms acquiring the technology
at little or no cost.58
" Richard Caves uses a public goods approach to explain the existence of
MNEs. CAVES, supra note 17. MNEs constitute internalization of
productive assets displaced in various national territories. See also MARK
CASSON, THE FIRM AND THE MARKET: STUDIES ON MULTINATIONAL
ENTERPRISE AND THE SCOPE OF THE FIRM 29 (1987) (arguing that "[b]ecause
knowledge has the characteristics of a 'public good,' the firm with privileged
knowledge tends to become multinational").
56 See Stephen P. Magee, Information and Multinational Corporation: An
Appropriability Theory of Direct Foreign Investment, in THE NEW
INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER: THE NORTH-SOUTH DEBATE 317 (Jagdish
N. Bhagwati ed., 1977) (analyzing the private market creation of technology,
relating it to the observed behavior of multinational corporations, and
drawing policy implications based on the analysis).
" Note that nondisclosure operates in the absence of formal property
rights. Still, the ability of an organization to contain technology is founded
on a range of legal remedies.
" More precisely, internalization retards the inevitable diffusion of
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Firms, with their command hierarchies, can eliminate
much of the free-riding and other difficulties associated with
the development and use of productive assets with public good
characteristics. 9 The internalization here is complex because
it is predicated on the state's recognition of an intellectual
property right and its willingness to guarantee exclusivity of
use to the proprietor. These guarantees are not only embodied
in formal intellectual property rights, such as patents, which
restrain use by rival firms, but also in private law mechanisms
which enable firms to confine technology successfully.60 For
example, a firm may discipline an employee who effects an
unauthorized diffusion of proprietary firm expertise.
Public goods appear to be natural objects for joint ventures
and strategic alliances because sharing an asset may generate
additional rents to the proprietor. In its simplest form, a
public good embodies an underutilized economy of scale.
Hennart tells a convincing story about scale-driven joint
ventures in the aluminum industry.61 For technological
reasons, the economies of scale of bauxite mines and
aluminum refineries are different; a single mine can supply
several refineries. Because of the great variation of bauxite
ores, an aluminum refinery can process only the output of a
particular mine. Aluminum producers enter into joint
ventures for both mines and refineries, collectively avoiding
opportunistic exploitation of the technologically vulnerable
refineries yet permitting the undertaking of large, capital-
intensive investments that might be beyond the risk tolerance
of a particular firm."
Hennart argues that joint ventures are vehicles for
bypassing inefficient markets for intermediate goods.6"
technology.
" Morck and Yeung provide empirical support for this proposition.
Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Internalization: An Event Study Test, 33
J. INT'L ECON. 41 (1992) (noting that multinational corporations possessing
information-related intangible assets with public good qualities which
announce a foreign acquisition have "positive stock price" reaction, while
those without such assets have "at best zero abnormal returns").
6' These private law mechanisms include fair competition laws and
enforcement of loyalty and confidentiality obligations.
61 Hennart, supra note 41, at 364-65.
2 Id.
3Id. at 364.
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Although Hennart's transaction cost theory of equity joint
ventures is both powerful and elegant, it seems to fit some
complex organizational cases better than others. Like
Williamson, Hennart eschews oligopolistic explanations.
3. PRODUCTIVE GOODS AND THE ACCESS DECISION
3.1. Productive Goods
The optimal organizational structure frequently and
increasingly requires a transnational distribution of
production. When this is so, internalization dictates an MNE,
an organizational unit that crosses national boundaries.
Neoclassical international trade economics suggests that
production will be located in the country which possesses a
"comparative advantage," expressed in relative factor prices.64
The location-of-production question is, however, sensitive to
institutional arrangements, a point not adequately appreciated
by traditional international trade theorists.6" Internalization
of a particular asset may be sensible for a local firm but not
for a foreign one. Here it is neither the particular productive
asset nor the transaction that is determinative of the
institutional form but rather the identity of the transactor.66
Given transnational production, the decisional analysis
then proceeds to the internalization question.6" According to
Williamson, this involves a comparative analysis of
institutional forms, with internalization favored where market
transaction costs are relatively high or, equivalently, where
markets fail. 8  Dunning's eclectic paradigm similarly
" See generally John H. Dunning, The Eclectic Paradigm of International
Production: A Restatement and Some Possible Extensions, 19 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 1 (1988) (discussing the limits of the neoclassical Heckscher-Ohlin-
Samuelson theory).
" Hymer, Caves, Dunning and other MNE theorists are, however, aware
of this point. See Sanna Randaccio, supra note 36, at 152-62.
"' This is a formulation of Dunning's concept of ownership advantages.
See Dunning, supra note 64, at 2-4.
" Anderson and Gatignon describe this question as the "mode of entry"
decision, where entry connotes the organization of assets within a particular
national territory. Erin Anderson & Hubert Gatignon, Modes of Foreign
Entry: A Transaction Cost Analysis and Propositions, 17 J. INT'L Bus.
STUD. 1, 2 (1986).
6 According to Williamson's characterization of Coase's early formulation
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suggests internalization (in the form of foreign direct
investment, given a transnational distribution of production)
where firms possess firm-specific advantages that they prefer
not to alienate.6 9
The organizational decision is more complex than
determining whether a firm should purchase a productive
asset (internalization) or its output (market-purchasing). This
complex decision may be described as an "access decision," in
which internalization is only one of a larger set of possibilities.
A firm must obtain access to all necessary productive assets;
"transactions" are the exchanges by which such access is
obtained.7 °
Access to a productive good can be achieved in two ways.
First, a firm can directly access the productive good itself.
Second, a firm can access the output of the productive good.
That is, one can control the chicken or control the eggs. Where
one places the organizational frontier (in a vertical integration
sense) determines the institutional form with respect to the
particular productive good.
of the transaction cost theory of the firm:
Whether transactions were organized within a firm (hierarchically)
or between autonomous firms (across a market) was thus a decision
variable. Which mode was adopted depended on the transaction
costs that attended each.
WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 4.
8 See Dunning, supra note 64, at 10-11.
70 Hennart distinguishes methods of organization (price system versus
hierarchy) from institutional choice. Thus, even when a polar institutional
form is used, a mix of organizational methods will often be observed. A
market transaction will rely predominantly on the price system, but it may
have hierarchical features (i.e., behavioral controls) as well. See Hennart,
supra note 41, at 361-62.
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ACCESS To PRODUCTIVE GOODS AND
ORGANIZATIONAL FRONTIERS
Productive Good =====FRONTIER--====
-====FRONTIER===== Productive Good
Output Output
Market Firm
Long-term Contract
As will be suggested infra, the access decision includes (i)
whether recourse to a productive asset is on a spot or
continuous basis, and (ii) whether such access is to be
exclusive or shared. This in turn will suggest variety in the
nature of organizational frontiers. A frontier represents more
than a dividing line between internalized and noninternalized
assets where command displaces the price mechanism. A firm
can display several kinds of borders: some finite and hard and
others fuzzy and permeable.
The organizational frontiers between parties to a joint
venture or partners in an alliance are of a different kind than
the normal membranes dividing the unitary firm from its
environment. A firm participating in a joint venture or
strategic alliance may obtain continuous access to a productive
good, such as a technology or a distribution network, even
though the good is shared. When one firm licenses use to a
good internalized by another, there is a frontier between the
two firms, a frontier which differs in kind from that between
two spot contractors.7 1 When two firms jointly own an asset,
the asset is not wholly owned by either, but it may be
internalized, in the sense of being subject to command
hierarchy, by both. In this case, there may be two fuzzy
frontiers between each firm and the productive good but no
direct frontier between the two participating firms. 2
"1 Financial flows will be distributed differently. Rather than spot prices,
firms will distribute flows based on the productivity of the good, such as
percentages of sales in trademark licensing.
7 Comparing these frontier descriptions helps to describe the differences
between strategic alliances, in which firms relate directly, and equity joint
ventures, in which firms relate to the commonly-held asset (i.e., the joint
venture company).
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3.2. Quasi-Public Goods
A firm demands exclusive access to those productive assets
which generate competitive advantages. Proprietary
technologies are the prime examples of such assets, as are
assets subject to physical scarcity. When exclusively
controlled by a single firm, these assets are withheld in two
ways. First, by controlling strategic productive assets, their
output may be restricted in pursuit of a classical monopoly
strategy. Second, the productive assets yielding such output
may be hoarded. Only by controlling the productive assets,
inputs, can a monopolist or oligopolist restrict the total flow of
output.
Other, nonstrategic assets may be profitably shared
without dissipating rents. Indeed, these assets are freely
alienable and may be distributed to all comers. 3 Every sale
results in marginal revenue. A firm with nonstrategic excess
capacity will either sell the capacity or rent its use. This,
again, is an economy-of-scale story. The market is an
institution based on nonexclusion.
Certain assets, referred to here as quasi-public goods, are
best exploited through shared access, whereby a limited
number of firms share use of the productive asset but jointly
withhold use from all other market participants. Collective
control of the productive asset-and thus indirect control of
the total output-remains essential in these sharing
strategies. Here, too, economies of scale are exploited. These
economies may not, however, be fully exhausted in the
technological sense because efficiency gains are
counterbalanced by loss of oligopoly rents as control of a
productive asset dissipates.
The joint maximization of efficiencies and conservation of
rents merely provide the statics explanation for the delimited
sharing of a quasi-public good. A complex economic
organization can discipline technological diffusion, thereby
maintaining dynamic R&D advantages for an innovating firm.
Indeed, sharing technology may have the perverse effect of
depressing rival firm innovation, creating a strategic
"' For example, consider a farmer who inherits a second tractor. If one
tractor is sufficient to operate her farm, she will either sell the tractor or
lease it to another, more needy farmer.
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dependency advantageous to the innovating firm.7 4
4. THE DETERMINANTS OF COMPLEX
ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
4.1. Spot/Continuous Access Axis
There are at least two dimensions to consider when
explaining the presence of complex organizational forms. The
first dimension is temporal in nature: whether access to a
productive good may be bargained for and obtained on an
occasional, repeated basis or whether important terms of
access must be secured over a longer period of time. I term
this the "spot/continuous access decision."
The spot/continuous access decision is consistent with
Williamson's "fundamental transformation."75  Where
markets function well, spot access is adequate. Absent a
compelling internalization efficiency, a firm will purchase
inputs from third parties on an as-needed basis.76 This is
particularly true for commodity inputs. A well-functioning
market assures fair, non-opportunistic prices and adequate
quantities from a variety of sources over a long period of time.
There is little advantage to be gained7 7 from securing
74 See MICHAEL E. PORTER, THE COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE OF NATIONS 613
(1990) ("The most serious risk of alliances is that they deter the firm's own
efforts at upgrading. This may occur because management is content to rely
on the partner.").
Strategic alliances have been ominously described as "an indirect
strategic weapon to slowly 'deskill' a partner who does not understand the
risks inherent in such arrangements." David Lei & John W. Slocum, Jr.,
Global Strategy, Competence-Building and Strategic Alliances, 35 CAL.
MGMT. REV. 81, 82 (1992). Similar vulnerabilities can exist with respect to
distribution networks. See Atik, supra note 28, at 310-11.
75 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 61-63.
7' The just-in-time practice that originated with Japanese manufacturers
substantially shortened the period-and increased the frequency-of
supplier transactions. These transactions may not be true "spot"
transactions, as they are often conducted within a relational contract. See
Atik, supra note 28, at 276-77 n.19 (discussing the relational contract which
applies to long-term arrangements through which parties deal repeatedly);
see also Ronald J. Gilson & Mark J. Roe, Understanding the Japanese
Keiretsu: Overlaps Between Corporate Governance and Industrial
Organization, 102 YALE L.J. 871, 884-88 (1993) (discussing the keiretsu
model of the Japanese economic system).
7' Eliminating price volatility can be accomplished through a mix of
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continuous access to commodities which are likely to be freely
and reliably available in the future."8 Note that spot access
admits both outright purchase of inputs as well as spot use of
those productive goods giving rise to the needed inputs.
In cases where markets fail, the small numbers
condition, 9 spot access becomes hazardous, and continuous
access is preferable in order to reduce opportunism. Again,
this aspect is temporal in nature. Continuous access means a
firm can obtain a flow of inputs without having to bargain
repeatedly for them. Ownership of a productive asset (i.e.,
internalization) necessarily provides continuous access to its
outputs. Continuous access may also be secured in other
organizational arrangements, such as long-term contracting.
A long-term contract can be drawn either for use of a
productive good, such as an equipment lease, or for its product,
such as an output contract. A technology license is an example
of a long-term contract for use of a productive good, the good
being the proprietary knowledge necessary to produce and
exploit wanted inputs.
A long-term output contract thus sits on the same pole with
ownership in that it provides continuous access to a productive
good, a result consistent with the "Coase theorem" and well
known to business planners and corporate lawyers.8" Both
ownership and long-term contracts eliminate the need to
bargain over a greater period of time.
Long-term contracting may have different financial
characteristics than ownership," depending on how prices
options and/or futures contracts.
78 KENNETH J. ARROW, THE LIMITS OF ORGANIZATION 40-42 (1974)
(discussing various costs of information and their fluctuations due to
familiarity and other factors).
79 See WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 61 (noting
the benefits of a "large numbers bidding condition").
80 The use of long-term leases and other forms of complex organization is
sometimes motivated by extrinsic advantages, such as tax breaks. In such
cases, planners seek to graft many of the incidents of ownership onto an
otherwise distinct legal form. See WILLIAM A. KLEIN & JOHN C. COFFEE,
JR., BUSINESS ORGANIZATION AND FINANCE: LEGAL AND ECONOMIC
PRINCIPLES 295-96 (5th ed. 1993) (noting the advantages of leasing as
opposed to purchasing an asset subject to debt).
81 The supplier party to a long-term output contract essentially owns an
option on the value of the productive asset upon expiration of the contract.
The purchaser in a sense holds a lease of the productive asset. Id- at 48-50.
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are set. The sales price for a productive asset essentially
freezes the cost of the output it will produce over time."2 A
long-term contract may or may not have the same result.
The spot/continuous access axis thus appears as follows:
SPOT ACCESS CONTINUOUS ACCESS
Market Ownership
Long-term Contract
Transaction cost theory suggests internalization will occur
where market failure is likely.83 Internalization results
where the costs of internal (command) ordering are less than
market (price) ordering. The spot/continuous access dimension
tracks this reasoning. Spot access is relatively cheaper in
well-functioning markets. In small-numbers situations, where
Williamson finds internalization,84  this model suggests
continuous access, which may be satisfied by either formal
ownership or long-term contracts. Both forms suppress
opportunism, and both permit the use of command governance.
4.2. Exclusivity Axis
There is another important dimension to consider: whether
access to the productive asset must be exclusive or may be
shared. If the spot/continuous access decision reflects a
minimization of transaction costs, the shared/exclusive access
decision is driven by the desire to preserve imperfect
competition rents or other strategic advantages.
Some assets, by their physical nature, can only be used
exclusively. That is, access by one firm necessarily precludes
access by another.85 Take, for example, the famed French
spring Source Perrier. It produces (or so we are led to believe)
82 Finance theory predicts that the sales price will be the expected value
of the return of the asset over its useful lifetime, adjusted for external and
internal risks. See generally id. at 303-24 (discussing methods of valuing
assets and enterprises).
See supra note 15 and accompanying text.
See WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 12, at 26-30.
85 This susceptibility to exclusion is an economic definition of a private
good. See supra note 18 (defining private good).
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a finite flow of water every year. The firm which captures this
water necessarily withholds it from all other firms. It is true
that the Perrier spring conceivably could be tapped by several
firms,86 but the quantity of water harvested by any one firm
would necessarily diminish the quantity that could be
harvested by another, effecting an exclusion. In some sense,
physical limits can be analyzed simply as an absence of scale
economies. They may, however, generate valuable rents to
their owners.
Other assets are available in such large quantities that the
amount drawn by any one firm has no discernible effect on
other firms which desire access to comparable inputs. Most
commodities fit into the "nonexclusive" category so that no
purchaser can "corner the market" in a commodity. A
computer manufacturer may buy its cathode ray tubes from an
array of vendors. While the computer manufacturer will
certainly own, in the legal sense, the monitors it purchases, it
does not by so owning these inputs significantly diminish its
competitors' access. The competitors may easily purchase
identical monitors from the same or rival vendors.87 A well-
functioning market will reliably provide goods on a "spot" basis
with no viable opportunism and on a nonexclusive basis to all
willing purchasers and thus with no diminishment of access to
rival firms.
In contrast, a piece of proprietary technology may be
hoarded by its owner. This is the essence of the monopoly
granted to patent owners: while the information underlying
the patent may be published, its use is restricted by law to its
owner and the owner's permittees. Goods embodying the
patent are subject to exclusivity, in that they are deliberately
withheld from rivals.88 There are many telling examples
from the pharmaceutical industry. Holders of pharmaceutical
patents have notoriously exercised their industrial property
86 This would create a "tragedy of the commons," whereby unrestricted
access to a common asset causes all to overutilize it, resulting in an
aggregate negative effect. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons,
162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244-45 (1968).
8" In this case, there will be a concomitant price effect that may or may
not be negligible. See TIROLE, supra note 10, at 65.
88 Rivals may obtain access to a patented technology by negotiating a
licensing agreement with the patent holder. This license may operate to
protect, or even increase, the owner's monopoly rents. See id. at 410-14.
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rights to block exploitation by rival firms, even in markets
they chose not to service."
Exclusivity is also sought over those assets which are
deemed to be "appropriable."" An appropriable asset is one
which can be duplicated at low cost. Exclusivity is a means of
containing the information incorporated in an appropriable
technology, preserving a return on the investment made by an
innovator.
A good which incorporates a proprietary technology may
appear to be a commodity to firms seeking access to it because
it is reliably available on a seemingly spot, nonexclusive basis.
Nonetheless, it may still be subject to opportunism by the
technology holder. For example, a computer manufacturer
may purchase chips from Intel. Its purchases do not
significantly affect the number of microchips Intel holds
available for sale, and therefore it is unable to diminish its
competitors' access to Intel microchips. Nevertheless, in
exercising monopoly power over its proprietary technology,
Intel may limit the total number of microchips it sells."
Finally, some goods may be shared at very low cost and
with very slight exclusionary effects. Excess computer
capacity is an example of a good that may be shared in this
way. 2 Productive goods are commodities if they yield no
rents and can therefore be shared without declining marginal
revenues.
"' Nations affected by these practices responded by instituting working
requirements and mandatory licensing.
O See Magee, supra note 56, at 326-28 (discussing extensively the issue
of appropriability).
S It is not clear whether Williamson would consider a patent holder's
insistence on monopoly profits to be an instance of opportunism, which he
refers to as "self-interest seeking with guile." WILLIAMSON, ECONOMIC
INSTITUTIONS, supra note 12, at 47; see generally id. at 47-49 (discussing
opportunism in detail). Monopoly power arises from a particular kind of
small-numbers bidding problem.
2 General Motors purchased the data firm EDS from Ross Perot in 1984.
Nancy Hass & Marc Levinson, Off the Reservation, Computers: EDS
Ponders Life Without Ross Perot and General Motors, NEWSWEEK, May 30,
1994, at 56, 57. General Motors intended to commit a large portion of EDS'
computer capacity to its internal use and lease the rest out to third parties.
Id. "CEO Roger Smith bought EDS for GM's personal use-to integrate all
of its systems worldwide." Id. at 57.
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Together, these three possibilities suggest the following
continuum:
ASSET EXCLUSIVITY AXIS
NoNExcLusIvE SEMIEXCLUSIVE ExcLusIvE
Commodities Quasi- Public Goods
Public Goods (Strategic)
Note that public goods can easily be private property. The
notion of a public good describes a technological characteristic
of the asset in that it gives rise to diminishing marginal costs.
It does not necessarily imply that the good is in the public
domain. Absent state protection, chiefly in the form of
property rights, most public goods would inevitably fall into
the public domain.
Valuable technology will either be a strategic public good
or a quasi-public good. The difference may not be intrinsic to
the technology itself but rather to the optimal industrial
structure set to exploit it. Thus, where the optimal industrial
structure is a single firm, sharing of the good will not be
considered because doing so would destabilize the competitive
structure. By contrast, the optimal industrial structure-
again, from the controlling firm's viewpoint in maximizing its
total rents-may involve multiple firms sharing the
technology."
As they age, technologies may pass from public good to
quasi-public good status.9 4 There are several empirical
"'For example, Apple recently announced that it would license its
Macintosh operating system to third parties, thus creating the first
legitimate Macintosh clones. Apple Under the Knife, ECONOMIST, Oct. 22,
1994, at 73. In addition, Bulova licensed its tuning fork technology to
Citizen Watch of Japan, which then applied the technology to other
electronic applications. See Lei & Slocum, supra note 74, at 84.
"' Teece has argued that the technology-transfer costs of MNEs are below
those of joint ventures and licensing but that the deficiencies of these forms
diminish over time. He thus projected a cycle for the exploitation of
technology. See DAVID J. TEECE, THE MULTINATIONAL CORPORATION AND
THE RESOURCE COST OF INTERNATIONAL TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER 80-82
(1976); see also Cletus C. Coughlin, The Relationship between Foreign
Ownership and Technology Transfer, 7 J. COMP. ECON. 400, 408 (1983)
(discussing Teece's argument in detail).
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studies which suggest that firms initially internalize new
technologies, using MNE structures to exploit them in
different national territories. As the technologies mature,
innovators are more likely to enter strategic alliances or joint
ventures built around these technologies. 5
4.3. Matrix of Organizational Forms
4.3.1. The Matrix
The two axes considered above are meant to capture
important features of the terms of access to a productive good.
The first axis expresses the vulnerability to opportunism; the
second represents the importance of control of strategic
productive assets in order to exclude others. When we
consider these two dimensions together, we obtain the
following matrix:
MATRIX OF ORGANIZATIONAL FORMS
SPOT CONTINUOUS
EXCLUSIVE [empty Firm (internalization)/MNE
cell?] Output Contracts
Exclusive Distributorship
SEMI- Strategic Alliances
EXCLUSIVE Equity Joint Ventures
NON- Market Licensing
EXCLUSIVE Franchising
Various common institutional forms are displayed in these
cells, but note that these placements are somewhat tentative.
Further, certain categories may spill over into different cells.
"See Chwo-Ming Joseph Yu & Ming-Je Tang, International Joint
Ventures: Theoretical Considerations, 13 MANAGERIAL & DECISION ECON.
331, 336 (1992). Yu and Tang argue that U.S. MNEs preferred establishing
wholly-owned subsidiaries (internalization) prior to the 1970s, a period of
marked technological cost advantages for U.S. enterprises. Id. As the
technological lead in the United States waned, however, U.S. MNEs began
to favor joint ventures as a preferred entry strategy to foreign markets. Id.
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For example, a licensing agreement may have a high degree of
exclusivity and dependence and therefore be accurately
described as a strategic alliance, or it may be available
generically to many licensees.
Again, continuous access to a productive asset will be
sought where Williamsonian opportunism is likely, whereas
spot access is optimal in well-functioning markets. Exclusive
access fits firms with strategic assets, general access is
associated with commodities, and joint access to quasi-public
goods generates a host of complex forms. The essential insight
promoted here is that access has at least two dimensions: one
refers to opportunism and the other to competitiveness. Thus,
the matrix is perhaps more "eclectic" 6 than are more purely
transaction cost explanations of organizational hybrids.
4.3.2. Spot /Nonexclusive Cell
In this matrix, market-contracting is located in the spot/
nonexclusive cell. Markets function well in large-number
conditions. Where markets function, a firm requiring an
output can reliably obtain access to it, lessening the pressure
for internalization. Internalization has its costs too, as
Williamson reminds us,9" and firms will resort to market
contracting for those inputs that are distant from their core
competencies. In strong markets, there is an ongoing
confidence regarding access on reasonable terms, thus favoring
spot transactions.
Markets imply, however, multiple transactors for each
vendor. A firm which resorts to access through the market to
obtain an input recognizes that the identical input is also
available, perhaps on comparable terms, to its competitors.
Thus a foregone strategic opportunity for a monopsonist may
create a monopolist. For example, IBM made a strategic
decision to obtain the operating systems for its personal
computers from a third-party vendor, Microsoft.9" Microsoft
sells its operating system, MS-DOS, to IBM's competitors as
" By analogy to John Dunning's "eclectic theory" of foreign direct
investment, this matrix combines efficiency and strategic elements. See
generally Dunning, supra note 64, at 8-9.
8 WILLIAMSON, MARKETS AND HIERARCHIES, supra note 12, at 20-21.
s See Stratford Sherman, The New Computer Revolution, FORTUNE, June
14, 1993, at 56.
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well." Microsoft, like Intel in the example described above,
may extract rents from sales of MS-DOS, a "commodity," to all
of its customers."°  Microsoft is somewhat disciplined,
however, because at some point IBM, or other manufacturers,
might abandon MS-DOS for a proprietary (internalized)
operating system. 1'
4.3.3. Continuous /Exclusive Cell
In the continuous/exclusive cell resides the unitary firm.
The transaction cost explanation for the existence of firms
emphasizes the firm as a response to opportunism. As
explained above, continuous access to necessary inputs is
important in order to address opportunism. A firm is only one
institutional variant which secures continuous access. Why
then are firms utilized when there is a range of institutional
solutions to opportunism?
Exclusivity of access is an equally important consideration
driving the choice of a unitary firm as an institutional
arrangement. Indeed, there is no organizational form superior
to the firm for restricting access to valuable technology. 2
"A recent article explained:
In its rush to get a personal computer to market, IBM decided to
rely on Intel's microprocessors and the DOS operating system,
which Microsoft didn't create from scratch but bought from another
Seattle company for $50,000. IBM made both Microsoft and Intel
sign elaborately detailed contracts that, quite amazingly, left them
completely free to sell to IBM's competitors.
Id. at 68.
Contrast this with Apple's use of a proprietary, "internalized" operating
system. While developing its own operating system may have introduced
certain inefficiencies, Apple has largely been successful in withholding its
operating system from its competitors. See, e.g., Apple Under the Knife,
supra note 93, at 73.
100 Ironically, it was IBM's selection of Intel's microchips and Microsoft's
MS-DOS as IBM standards which created these rents. Intel CEO Andrew
Grove has stated: "I'm very grateful to IBM for making us that gift."
Sherman, supra note 98, at 58.
'0' See Do It My Way, ECONOMIST, Feb. 27, 1993 (supplement, A Survey
of the Computer Industry), at 11, 12. IBM, together with Microsoft, has
developed OS/2, a new proprietary operating system, which was not
intended to be made available to IBM's rivals. OS/2 has not been very
successful at distinguishing IBM's personal computers from those
manufactured by its competitors. See Sherman, supra note 98, at 74.
102 This issue is explored extensively in the literature concerning MNEs.
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The internal discipline maintained within a firm can
effectively discourage diffusion. The legal notion of "trade
secret" embodies a free flow of knowledge within the firm,
coupled with a rigorous barricade against the exterior.
Consequently, firms permit technological flow within the firm's
limits, and they can therefore facilitate technology transfer.
A relatively large firm, such as an MNE, may permit the
exploitation of technology in many markets while effectively
excluding competitors from access to strategic productive
assets.
Holders of valuable assets 03 may resist joint ventures,
licenses and other forms of strategic alliances for fear of losing
control of these assets.0'4 While these forms may provide
safeguards against technological diffusion, they do not match
the hermetic qualities of a unitary firm.105 A more complete
theory of the firm will emphasize both the firm as a response
to opportunism and its effectiveness for containing technology.
See generally Sanna Randaccio, supra note 36.
103 The valued asset is not necessarily a technology. IBM resisted any
kind of joint venture or licensing for years, in part, it has been argued, to
avoid yielding valued inoperability with rival systems. See Alan Robinson,
IBM to Bid Again to Build Computers in Mexico, MIAMI HERALD, Feb. 4,
1985 (Business Supplement), at 23.
104 IBM rigorously avoided international equity joint ventures. For
example, it chose to withdraw from the Indian market rather than submit
to India's mandatory joint venture law. See Joseph M. Grieco, Between
Dependency and Autonomy: India's Experience with the International
Computer Industry, in MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS: THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 58-59 (Theodore H. Moran ed.,
1985). IBM's reputation for hostility to joint ventures allowed it, unlike any
other U.S. computer manufacturer, to avoid Mexico's prior mandatory joint
venture law. See Robinson, supra note 103, at 23.
"' Ahern describes the bitter experience of a Canadian firm, which
claimed its foreign joint venture partner "stole technology, manufactured the
product (in the same plant where they took advantage of scale and joint-use
economies), and sold it, at a reduced price, in direct competition with the
alliance partner." R. Ahern, Implications of Strategic Alliances for Small
R&D-Intensive Firms, 25 ENV'T & PLAN. A 1511, 1518 (1993). The CEO of
a second Canadian firm was less perturbed: "[A]fter all, we stole technology
from [two other firms] to develop our first [circuit] board.'" Id. at 1520.
Thus, the risk of diffusion to an alliance partner is a separate issue from the
risk of diffusion to external competitors.
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4.3.4. Continuous ISemiexclusive Cell
The conjunction of opportunism concerns with the presence
of viably-shared economic rents provides an environment
appropriate for complex organizations, such as joint ventures
and strategic alliances. Complex economic organizations
provide continuous access to key productive assets. A firm can
typically draw on a joint asset in a manner not dissimilar to
its dealings with wholly-owned, internalized assets. Consider
two firms which commonly invent a technology, such as
Phillips and Sony, which developed the compact audio
disc." 6 Each firm can produce products incorporating the
compact disc technology. Each firm can treat the technology
as its own in producing its products.' A complex economic
organization may permit each participating firm to exert
command governance over a productive asset.
This simultaneous, independent command may be subject
to limits. First, there may be a finite number of firms which
can efficiently use a productive asset. Economies of scale may
limit the optimal number of firms taking a command interest
in a particular good. For example, during the nineteenth
century, several railroads wishing to cross the Mississippi
River at St. Louis built a bridge together to carry their
trains."0 8 Up to a certain density of traffic, each railroad
could run its trains over the bridge as if it were a wholly-
owned part of its rail system. At a certain point, however, the
collective demand placed on the bridge would exhaust its total
capacity, requiring each railroad to deal with its partners in
order to secure passage rights.
Second, management costs may increase as the number of
participating firms increases. Likewise, the potential for inter-
firm conflict may increase with the number of partners. This
,08 See Michael Schrage, IBM Looks at Optical Laser Discs, WASH. POST,
Mar. 9, 1984, at El (noting that the compact audio disc was jointly
introduced by Sony Corporation of Japan and N.V. Phillips of Holland).
107 Each firm benefits from the other's use of the technology, as they
jointly establish compact disc technology as a standard. Id. at E2.
10" See Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power over Price, 96 YALE L.J.
209, 234 (1986) (discussing United States v. Terminal R.R. Ass'n, 224 U.S.
383 (1912)). For an historical account, see JAMES NEAL PRIMM, LION OF THE
VALLEY 311 (1981).
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is but a transaction cost limitation on the viability of complex
economic organizations. The Airbus consortium is comprised
of aircraft firms from the United Kingdom, Germany, France
and Spain;"' additional partners drawn from the remaining
European Union member states might have caused the
consortium to break down.
Third, utilization of certain joint assets might require the
cooperation of the other participant to the alliance or joint
venture. Indeed, this mutual dependency may be the key to
the structural stability of large, noncontractual
organizations.
110
Both equity joint ventures and strategic alliances are
included in the continuous/semiexclusive category. Despite the
casual manner in which these terms have been introduced,
there are important organizational differences between these
two archetypal forms."'
An equity joint venture involves the establishment by two
firms of a third entity, the joint venture company, which is
usually separately incorporated. In an equity joint venture,
each partner firm owns shares in the joint venture company.
This third entity is the productive asset with which each
partner transacts; there is little direct interaction between the
two sponsoring firms. In one sense, at least with respect to
corporate formalism, the joint venture company is external to
both sponsoring firms. In other respects, the joint venture
company may be subject to limited command from each
sponsoring firm. An equity joint venture thus represents a
peculiar type of internalization.
With a strategic alliance, two participating firms transact
directly with each other. Each firm may provide the other
with access to an internalized (owned) asset; one firm may
provide technology or a product, the other a distribution
channel. Reciprocal access to assets may even be
provided." 2 While the firms may share access to key assets,
100 See Eglin, supra note 21, at 27.
110 See Atik, supra note 28, at 311-13.
. Hennart recognizes this distinction. Accordingly, he limits his
transaction cost model to equity joint ventures. See Hennart, supra note 23,
at 4.
112 For example, in the strategic alliance between AT&T and Olivetti, each
firm provided the other with access to its distribution network. AT&T sold
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their respective abilities to command those assets are not
equivalent. The firm which "owns" the asset may possess
greater certainty and control than the firm which merely
enjoys "use" rights. The continuous/semiexclusive access
category includes both of these types of organizational
arrangements.
5. COMPLEX ORGANIZATIONS: JOINT OWNERSHIP
AND SHARED USE
5.1. Joint Ownership
Joint ownership can describe a variety of institutional
forms. Generally, joint ownership provides for relatively
unrestricted, on-demand use by each of the co-owners of a
productive asset, while at the same time barring all other
firms from use of the asset.
An equity joint venture is one example of joint
ownership," 3 in that two partner firms jointly own the
shares of the joint venture. In such a case, the incorporated
joint venture may be the productive asset subject to joint
ownership. For example, General Motors and Toyota jointly
owned the shares to NUMMI,"' an incorporated car
manufacturing facility in Fremont, California, and both owner
companies marketed items produced by the NUMMI plant.'
Joint ownership becomes more problematic when one co-
owner has the ability to block access by the other co-owner. In
these cases, internalization may be far from complete in that
a co-owning firm may not unilaterally secure access to the co-
owned productive asset. Ajointly-owned asset subject to finite
Olivetti's personal computers in the United States, and Olivetti sold AT&T's
office equipment in Western Europe. For a discussion of the alliance
between AT&T and Olivetti, see Atik, supra note 28, at 274 n.3.
11 Equity joint ventures, on the other hand, may not be good examples of
joint ownership. The formal division of control represented by the relative
shareholding may not correspond to the effective access that each joint
venture partner has to the assets covered by the joint venture agreement.
114 NUMMI is an acronym for New United Motor Manufacturing, Inc.
Toyota Motor: Joint Venture to Continue, JAPAN 21ST, Sept. 1993, at 10.
"" See Union Members in California Approve Four-Year Contract, WALL
ST. J., Aug. 15, 1994, at B4. The cars produced by NUMMI include "the
Chevrolet Geo Prizm, the Toyota Corolla and the Toyota compact pickup
truck." Id,
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physical limits is necessarily subject to co-owner exclusion:
what one co-owner uses is no longer available to the other.
Quotas or other allocation mechanisms must be engineered to
avoid opportunism and conflict; a firm which remains within
the limits of its quota may enjoy relatively untrammeled
command.
A co-owned asset which requires ongoing cooperation by a
co-owner can be effectively withheld by a withdrawal of
support."6 This type of joint ownership produces a mutual
hostage situation."' Therefore, it is clear that joint-
ownership, as an institutional response, does not necessarily
eliminate access concerns.
For many assets, particularly those with "public good"
characteristics, joint ownership can provide each co-owner with
the possibility of command governance. A well-known
European Union case described the effort of various small
paint manufacturers to develop a common paint formula for
use on ocean vessels." 8 Each participating firm could draw
on this common asset (i.e., use the formula) without
restraint."9 The co-owning firms recognized, however, that
the commercial value of their formula would diminish if it
were placed in the public domain. Accordingly, they withheld
it from their competitors, provoking a competition action by
the European Commission. ° As the Transocean Marine
Paint case demonstrates, joint ownership also results in an
exclusion against non-co-owners.
Direct joint ownership of an incorporated joint venture may
effectively result in indirect joint ownership of ajoint venture's
assets. Thus, two parties to an equity joint venture may
obtain access to particular assets of the venture, such as a
n1 Access to a productive asset may require "two keys:" both co-owners
must cooperate to enjoy the benefit or use of the asset. Most equity joint
ventures require ongoing support from each co-owner to function.
117 For an explanation of reciprocal cooperation as a structural element
promoting alliance stability, see Atik, supra note 28, at 293.
118 See Case 17/74, Transocean Marine Paint Ass'n v. Commission, 1974
E.C.R. 1063; see also Commission Decision 67/454, Transocean Marine Paint
Ass'n, 1967 J.O. (163) 10.
"I Each manufacturer, however, was required to pay a commission for
sales made in another manufacturer's territory. Transocean Marine Paint
Ass'n, 1974 E.C.R. at 1065.
120 Commission Decision 67/454, supra note 118, at 11.
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*distribution network.
5.2. Shared Use
Contract-based shared use differs both formally and
structurally from joint ownership. Formally, one firm sharing
access remains the legal owner; its access is incident to its
ownership interest. The other firm enjoys access as a licensee
of the owner firm. While both firms enjoy a property interest
in the shared asset, their interests are not symmetrical.
Strategic alliances are built around the practice of shared
use.'21 For example, Chrysler shares its U.S. distribution
network and brand names with Mitsubishi. 2 Chrysler sells
certain Mitsubishi models under the Dodge and Plymouth
nameplates through Dodge and Chrysler-Plymouth
dealerships.123
Contract-based shared use may also introduce competition
between the participant firms.'24 This may not, however,
eliminate the enjoyment of imperfect competition gains. Firm
A, owner of a technology, may license Firm B on terms which
assure extraction of oligopoly rents. Intel, for example, has
licensed manufacture of various microchips to other microchip
manufacturers.'2 5  These firms compete with Intel, but
because they must pay royalties to Intel on the microchips
they sell, Intel is able to enjoy some rents from these
sales.'26
, See Atik, supra note 28, at 273.
See Ronald E. Yates, Cash-hungry Chrysler Sheds Diamond-Star, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 30, 1991, at 1.
123 As an illustration, in 1988, the author purchased a new Mitsubishi-
produced Plymouth Colt from a Chrysler-Plymouth dealer. The automobile
is marked "Imported for Plymouth" while the automobile's key is stamped
"Mitsubishi."
'
24 See Lei & Slocum, supra note 74, at 82.
125 See Charles T.C. Compton, Cooperation, Collaboration, and Coalition:
A Perspective on the Types and Purposes of Technology Joint Ventures, 61
ANTITRUST L.J. 861, 887 (1993) (describing certain strategic relationships
in the computer industry).
126 See, e.g., Louise Kehoe, Intel Closes Silicon Valley Plant, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 8, 1989, at 132 (noting that Intel expected to receive high royalty and
licensing revenues).
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5.3. Simultaneous Exclusive Access
A third case demonstrates that what appears to be shared
use can in fact be simultaneous exclusive access by a number
of firms exploiting a single asset in different territories. More
precisely, what may casually be thought of as a single asset
may in effect be a bundle of assets that can be neatly severed
along national lines. Technology embodied in industrial
property is in fact partitioned into a set of discrete territorial
property interests under the various national legal systems.
Thus, for Firm A to enjoy Japanese rights to a technology and
for Firm B to enjoy European rights to the same technology is
not in fact shared access to a single asset but is rather
mutually exclusive access to cleanly partitioned assets."
Simultaneous exclusive access, and not shared access,
underlies many international strategic alliances.
What makes this form interesting is that while the
productive assets are neatly partitioned, their respective
outputs may not be. Even if different firms are exploiting
productive assets in clearly segregated markets, they may
have a joint dissuasive effect on other potential market
entrants. Thus, segregated productive assets may in fact
constitute a form of sharing because they yield substitutable
outputs.
6. CONCLUSION
Contemporary theories of the firm fail to explain the
presence, and increasing prevalence, of complex organizational
forms of enterprise, such as strategic alliances, joint ventures
and other "hybrids." In part, this explanatory failure results
from the polar question that a theory of the firm seeks to
answer: why are certain economic exchanges (transactions)
effected across markets while others are conducted wholly
within the firm? The internalization question is nearly
universally posed in dichotomous terms. As such, there is as
much made of the explanations given to the "why not
markets?" question as to the "why?" question. Reasons why
markets are not efficient are deemed to be determinants of the
12? This proposition overstates the case somewhat. Technology that is not
encapsulated in formal industrial property rights, such as trade secrets and
tacit knowledge, is, in fact, shared.
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firm.28 and vice versa. Further, the dichotomy can be
expressed either in terms of institutional form (firms or
markets) or in terms of governance (command or price).
129
Simply put, merely showing that markets fail does not explain
the existence of firms, as there are other institutional
alternatives, including the complex economic organizations
discussed in this article.
Transaction cost economics provides only a partial
explanation for the existence of complex economic
organizations. While these arrangements are, in part, a
response to market failure, they also permit the selective
sharing of strategic assets among independent firms while
conserving valuable economic rents. I use the term "quasi-
public goods" to describe those assets which can be efficiently
shared by several firms through joint ownership or shared
access, but which are withheld from the public domain in order
to preserve competitive advantages. Complex economic
organizations exist to exploit quasi-public goods effectively.
General shared access is efficient in instances where there
is no rent associated with an asset;130 asset access costs are
reduced by their broadest distribution. A nondifferentiated
commodity (e.g., unskilled labor) or a public domain technology
is more profitably shared. A highly valued asset (such as a
rent-producing piece of proprietary technology), on the other
hand, is better restricted to exclusive access. The problem
here is not so much one of transaction cost minimization,
although there are small numbers concerns and Arrow's
paradox as well,'3 ' but it is rather a pure question of
economic rents. By creating competition, rents are destroyed.
Licensing can address most of the transaction cost/market
failure concerns associated with special assets, but it may be
unsuited to preserving oligopoly.
128 This is a parody of transaction cost theory.
129 The link between command governance with firms and the price
mechanism with markets is not without exception. Hennart has observed
that command governance is not exclusively associated with internalized
transactions and that the price mechanism can operate within firms,
thereby producing a richly variegated taxonomy of organizational forms.
See Hennart, supra note 41, at 370.
130 This is only the case when dealing with true public goods.
131 See Hennart, supra note 41, at 365 (discussing Arrow's paradox and
joint ownership as a possible solution).
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A quasi-public good may be shared at little marginal cost
by a select group of firms, but it can be effectively withheld
from general use. 12  Quasi-public goods will necessarily
produce rents; it is this quality which distinguishes them from
commodities. Thus, there is value to be preserved by limiting
their general diffusion.' 3
A complex economic organization is a superior structure to
exploit special productive assets (quasi-public goods) where (i)
the prospect of market failure makes spot-contracting
unreliable, (ii) access can be viably shared without general
diffusion but (iii) enhanced attention must be paid to
preserving economic rents.
132 Legal institutions exist to permit sharing of a technology among a
group of authorized firms while restricting use by rivals.
... See David J. Teece, Multinational Enterprise, Internal Governance, and
Industrial Organization, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 233, 235-36 (1985) (comparing
monopoly and efficiency interpretations of the MNE).
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